

## **Non-Citizen Political Participation for Problem Solving: Models from Germany and the United States**

Paper prepared for the conference "Innovation for Good Local and Regional Governance - A European Challenge" hosted by the Institute of Governance Studies and the Centre for the Study of Democracy of the University of Twente in cooperation with the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Province of Overijssel and the City of Enschede, University of Twente,

2 April 2009

Juniorprofessor Dr. Scott Stock Gissendanner  
Department of Political Science  
Georg August University  
Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3  
37073 Goettingen, Germany  
scott.gissendanner@sowi.uni-goettingen.de

*Abstract:* A movement away from representative democracy and hierarchical steering toward direct democracy and participative decisionmaking has been observed by empirical scientists, reflected upon by political philosophers, and encouraged emphatically by the Council of Europe, the European Commission, and the OECD. Importantly, almost all forms of participative decisionmaking are open non-citizen residents. This paper argues that the growth of opportunities for non-citizen political participation is fueled at least in part by the responses of public officials to complexity in integration policy. One logical way to respond to complexity is to incorporate the "objects" of steering within the decisionmaking process itself. When public officials begin to share power in this way, they kick off a cycle of mutual political adaptation that changes the political opportunity structure for non-citizens. One way of thinking about this is to posit a range of specific functions, varying in terms of power over the decisionmaking agenda, that even non-citizens can fulfill within various "models" of direct participation in problem solving processes: object, informant, contactor, co-producer, advisor, claimant, accountable-autonomous agent, and equal partner. A still preliminary examination of participatory forms in Germany and the United States shows that organizations granting these functions have emerged in both countries, although they have two very different citizenship regimes and very different experiences with immigration. This paper applies these observations to the policy recommendations of the Council of Europe.

## 1. Introduction

The ways in which public authorities interact with citizens has been receiving a lot of detailed attention in the past decades because of dissatisfaction with the traditional mode of governance in advanced industrial democracies – the combination of representative democracy and rational-instrumental forms of social regulation. In political practice, participatory institutions have already emerged everywhere, spurring the interest of scholars of public administration and democratic theory in the forms and functions of participative democracy. These debates plus more recent concerns regarding the decline of participation have helped spur supranational governance organizations of Europe to advise their member states to make greater use of diverse forms of political participation, especially at the local level and especially for young people, minorities, women, and – importantly for this paper – non-citizens<sup>1</sup> (Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 1981; Council of Europe 1992; Commission of the European Union 2001; Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 2001; OECD 2001).

What can explain the more frequent use of direct-participatory institutions, especially within the area of integration policy in which participants are often non-citizens? Existing explanations for the rise (and supposed decline) of direct political participation are still dominated by Ronald Inglehart's value-shift thesis and by the closely related studies of new social movements. Their hypothesis is that new forms of political participation are demand-driven, emerging because younger generations are less interested in voting and demand more power over actual decisionmaking processes (Inglehart and Abramson 1994; Dalton 2008). But why would disenfranchised non-citizens be given more participation opportunities when some studies show that given the same political opportunity structure they participate at lower rates than citizens of similar ethnic background (Leal 2002)? Despite the apparent lack of demand, few forms of direct participation differentiate on the basis of citizenship and some forms are even created with the express purpose of mobilizing non-citizens.

The first part of this paper offers a supply-side explanation for the emergence of participatory arrangements for non-citizens, arguing that it is driven by the desire of the holders of state power to increase the effectiveness of their regulatory systems. Public officials are under constant pressure to increase participation because it is an accepted way of dealing with the higher complexity of policy problems. The problems of immigration have morphed into complex integration issues, and public officials see it in their interest to create new opportunities for the direct democratic involvement of non-citizens.

But the story does not end there. When power holders invite immigrants into decisionmaking processes, this launches a longer process of mutual adjustment that has

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<sup>1</sup> The term "non-citizens" is used interchangeably with "immigrants" in this paper. Both refer to non-citizen residents, naturalized citizens and native born but non-naturalized residents. A strict definition of citizenship is difficult, and the multitude of residency statuses assigned to immigrants in any one country belies strict categories. For example, Germany currently uses 17 categories of citizenship: 13 visa types for non-EU citizens plus the statuses of EU-foreigner, full citizenship, dual citizenship, and full illegality (cf. Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2007: 184).

implications for the de facto meaning of citizenship. In the second section of the paper, the mutual adaptation process is modeled as a circuit that ideal-typically starts with public officials expanding participation opportunities but is then dampened or amplified by factors inherent to immigrant and their organizations. As immigrants begin to get involved in problem solving in a variety of institutional arrangements, they and their organizations can generate what I refer to below as "original" power, which is the power of smaller groups of people and organizations consensually committed to common goals. This offsets the influence of the state's command power and has implications for how we define citizenship.

The final part of this paper moves to an empirical investigation of the actual models of participation that have emerged in Germany and the United States. To systematize the comparison, I propose that we should expect that the different institutional arrangements emerging will vary in terms of the amount of original power immigrants and immigrant groups exercise in the production and implementation of integration policies. At the one extreme of the scale, immigrants function only as objects of manipulation in traditional, rational-instrumental policymaking arrangements. At the other extreme, groups of immigrants function as equal partners with state actors. A literature review yields a list of six additional possible potential functions for immigrants in participatory arrangements that lie somewhere in-between the two power extremes. I have labeled these functions as follows: informant, contactor, coproducer, advisor, claimant, and autonomous-accountable agent. Relying on a variety of sources including the internet, secondary literature, and discussions with experts and practitioners, I have begun collecting a list of the various forms of state-immigrant interaction as they are being used now and have been used in the past in Germany and the United States. Although I cannot provide anything like a complete picture of non-citizen participative activities, some patterns are evident and are discussed in the conclusion.

Germany and the United States were selected as cases for empirical investigation because they are very different in two ways. First, they have quite different rational-instrumental policy making traditions in the field of immigration and integration policy – strong in Germany, weak in the United States. Second, the two countries represent diametrically different citizenship regime types on the typology developed by Ruud Koopmans and colleagues (2005: 9). Germany's citizenship regime is ethnically-based and culturally monistic; it shows a low tolerance for cultural differences and acquiring citizenship there is relatively difficult. In contrast, the American concept of citizenship is civic-territorial and culturally pluralistic; it shows a high tolerance of multiple ethnic identities and acquiring citizenship is relatively easy. This comparison allows us to ask whether increased interaction between public officials and immigrants for joint problem solving leads to similar models of participation even in countries with different institutional and historical experiences with immigration.

## **2. The Broader Governance Context of Integration Policy: The Move from Rational-Instrumental to Direct-Democratic Forms of Political Steering**

When state actors try to solve the problems arising from immigration, they embark on the enterprise of political steering – the intervention in a running social system with the goal

of moving it from a less desirable to a more desirable state or preventing it from moving into a less desirable state. To accomplish this, one needs knowledge of how the system works and the power to change it (Mayntz, 1993; Scharpf, 1988, p. 63). In other words, all forms of political steering have epistemological and power dimensions.

The traditional mode of steering is top down, known also a rational-instrumental steering. The epistemology of rational-instrumental steering is analytical and involves the attempt to comprehend systems by breaking them down into simpler, component parts and quantifying the causal relationships between. Knowledge for this framework is expert knowledge. The kind of power necessary for rational-instrumental steering is the power to manipulate a system's components. Since the parts to be manipulated in social systems are related to human behavior, this kind of power is command power in the Weberian sense: getting someone to do what you want them to do regardless of their preferences. It is the power of a controller over an object.

The success of the rational-instrumental approach is limited to situations in which the objects of steering can be reduced to objects of manipulation. It is not effective for solving the more complex problems of integration. There is anecdotal and more systematic evidence that in municipalities experiencing greater immigration, public officials perceive the emergence of new and pressing problems in at least one and often more policy areas.<sup>2</sup> Given their perceptions, public officials may think it necessary or expedient to change existing policies. Yet immigrant problems even in single policy areas like education or policing are really a basket of many interlinked problems, and these cannot be addressed using rational-instrumental forms of policy making. For understanding why direct participation can help, consider the issue of complexity and what it means for policymaking abstractly.

### Complexity

The component parts of complex systems have four important "wicked" qualities: density of interaction, relative autonomy, reflexivity, and contingency. The interaction of the component parts of complex systems is "dense" in the sense that "current events heavily influence the probabilities of many kinds of later events" (Axelrod and Cohen 1999, p. 7 as noted in Wagenaar 2007, p.23). In chaos theory, this is known as the "sensitive dependence on initial conditions" or the butterfly effect. It occurs when early events are connected to the future by a multitudinous chain of interconnected events. The effect of an initial event is magnified over time in proportion to the density of the "chain" of events it touches on like a tipping domino. Second, the components of complex systems are relatively autonomous, meaning that they are sensitive to inputs from both inside *and* outside the system. This frustrates the efforts of someone trying to manipulate them because they do not respond to tweaking the same way every time unless the external system they touch on is held constant. Third, the component parts of a complex system are reflexive, i.e., they are aware of each other's existence and behaviors. This is a characteristic of every social system since their component parts are thinking individuals with free wills. The problem for steerers sets in when the people in their systems start

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<sup>2</sup> The mayor of Duisburg, Adolf Sauerland, identified the areas of education, cultural policy, housing, healthcare, job programs, city planning, and political participation as important for policy action (Sauerland 2006). Ramakrishnan and Lewis (2005: 13-14) provide evidence that in the California context, increased immigration is connected to elected officials' perception of greater policy challenges or problems for residents in the regulation of group conflicts, education, housing, and policing.

talking to each other, anticipating future events, each others' actions, and the actions of the steerer. Fourth, the workings of the system are contingent on fluctuating preconditions. Karl Popper articulated this aspect of social systems well with his clouds and clocks metaphor (cf. Almond and Genco 1977). In terms of their relative level of determinedness, some systems run like clocks with a high degree of causal reliability; the degree of contingency of their outcomes is low because their internal causal relationships are constant. Other systems are "cloudlike," i.e., highly undetermined. These systems run differently from one moment to the next. Social systems are somewhere between these extremes, with causal mechanisms with low reliability because they are contingent on some un-fixed preconditions. The more cloudlike the system, the faster the preconditions change, and the more complex the system is.

Trying to steer complex systems is plagued by two important problems. First, the effects of interventions are not predictable (Wagenaar 2007, p. 23). Small events in early stages can get blown up into big effects; massive interventions can dissipate to small effects. Second, complex systems take on meta-properties, also referred to as "emergent" properties. These are "properties of the system that the separate parts do not have and that are produced by the interaction between the parts" (Wagenaar 2007, p. 23). Examples include the flocking behavior of birds or the liquidity of a cup of H<sub>2</sub>O. Additional examples of emergent qualities in complex social systems can include things like the peaceful cohabitation between immigrants and "natives," local economic growth, full employment, the "hipness" of a city neighborhood, or the absence of crime. Societies have come to realize how precious these qualities are and demand that their politicians and administrators work to create these happy states of being. Integration policy is a prime example of an area in which power holders try to induce a desirable emergent property.

### Harnessing Complexity?

Trying to manipulate complex systems in order to conjure up a desired emergent property implies a radical change in the kinds of knowledge and power government officials need. First of all, because of their contingency and reflexivity, complex systems are "antireductionist" (Wagenaar 2007, p. 23). Since they do not allow themselves to be reduced to component parts, analysis will not work in this environment. Knowledge of the causal processes of a system cannot be stored outside of the system, squirreled away in the mind of an observant expert. Knowledge about the workings of a system is knowledge of multiple contingencies, of what X would do if Y did that. The problem for steering is that only the members of a system themselves have access to that kind of knowledge to a sufficient degree of comprehensiveness. When the object to be steered is complex, the dilemma of gaining enough knowledge to control it is impossible to resolve; their internal dynamics make them cognitively impenetrable for outsiders (Mayntz 1993: 15). Acquiring knowledge about how to steer such systems requires the incorporation of the "objects" of steering into the epistemology of the steering mechanism itself. In the rational-instrumental mode of steering, administrators "cogitated" (Wildavsky 1979), trying to get their heads around a system's workings. But for steering complex systems, everybody has to embark on collective cognition: putting their heads together to figure out how their system works and under what circumstances it can be changed.

Relative autonomy, reflexivity, and contingency all mean that a new form of power is required to steer complex systems: voluntary compliance. Voluntary compliance in this sense is not the passive lack of resistance to manipulation that occurs also in rational-instrumental forms of steering. Rather, it is a positive act of the will of the individuals whose behavior is supposed to be regulated by policy. This comes about when those persons are transformed from objects of manipulation into subjects with political influence. It occurs when public authorities open decisionmaking to the inputs of social actors, creating power by making common cause with other actors and then working in concert to reach jointly agreed-upon goals (Kooiman 1993; Stone 1989, p. 5). Steering like this is not a "command action" but rather a "cooperative mode of social coordination" (Mayntz, 1993, p. 11). Bob Jessop (2002: 43) calls this a move towards governance – a form of reflexive self-organization defined as heterarchical, on-going, negotiated consent to resolve complex problems.

The shift to participative governance entails a de facto transformation of the most relevant source of legitimate power from command "power over" to a joint production of a kind of "power to" or the kind of power that is created when a number of individuals cooperate for common purposes (Stone 1993; Arendt 1969, p. 44). This kind of power can be called proximate or *original* power because it originates in the group which uses it and exists only there. I will return to the idea of original power as a way of ordering the myriad forms of direct participation in section four.

For all these reasons, direct participation is superior to rational-instrumental policymaking for fostering desired emergent qualities in social systems. Direct participation helps to generate the knowledge needed to estimate the effects of interventions and the power needed to carrying them out.

### **3. Mutual Adaptation of Power Holders and Immigrants in Response to Complexity**

If power holders respond to complexity in integration policy by inviting immigrants into decisionmaking processes, they kick off a cycle of mutual adjustment. Figure 1 illustrates how such a process might proceed, conceived as a five stage process whereby each step is also influenced by factors ( $w$ ,  $x$ ,  $y$ , and  $z$ ) external to the model. The process begins when power holders perceive a need to react to complexity (step 1) and do so by changing the rules of political engagement so as to create arrangements of direct participation that do not discriminate on the basis of citizenship (step 2). Once immigrants are invited in, they and their organizations must mobilize participation (step 5), but mobilization is not caused directly by a change in institutional arrangements. Reactions in response to new opportunities are filtered by factors internal to individual immigrants and their organizations, a fact evidenced by the variation of participation levels among ethnic groups in the same country (Thränhardt 1999).<sup>3</sup>

The literature points to three sets of variables that can promote immigrant participation in direct democratic arrangements. The first set of variables work at the individual level and are not represented in the diagram. Looking only at Latino non-citizen participation in the

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<sup>3</sup> See Koopmans et al. 2005 for further discussion regarding the mechanisms of how institutional opportunity structure changes can interact with immigrants' frames.

United States, David Leal (2002) finds that political awareness (degree of information, understanding of politics, and perception of a problem), plans for naturalization, strong ethnic identity, and English language skills all have a positive effect on non-citizen political participation. Age, too, is significant: younger non-citizens are more likely to participate.

[Figure 1 about here.]

The other two sets of variables relate to group processes: framing (step 3) and organizations (Step 4). That framing matters is supported by research into how participation differs over time within the same institutional arrangements (Small 2002). Frames, a concept attributed to Goffman (1974), are defined as "an interpretative [schema] that simplifies and condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's present or past environment" (Snow and Benford 1992: 137, cited in Small 2002). This becomes salient for understanding participation because it helps explain why, given the same institutional opportunities, participation can vary among immigrant groups, between generations of the same groups, and from issue to issue. Some general lessons seem to be that participation is likely to be incited when a group perceives a common threat and participation is more likely to be sustained when participants' "perceived best opportunities" are tied to the available openings in the political opportunity structure (Small 2002). The perception of value in political participation is more likely among those persons with past experiences of successful cooperation in working toward political goals directly related to the participation opportunities at hand. For recent immigrants who are politically active, these experiences may have been gained in their countries of birth. For example, different experiences in resisting dictatorial regimes among Germany's Spanish, Greek, and Italian immigrants help explain their different levels of political integration (Thranhardt 1999).

With Step 4, we reach arguments stemming from the literature on the function of immigrant organizations for mobilizing participation that also help explain why similar political participation opportunities generate different responses across ethnic groups, times, and issues. The basic premise is that organizations can play a positive role in facilitating incorporation given any particular participation opportunity. Evidence of this is provided by studies of immigrant organizations that document a connection between the internal structural qualities of immigrant organizations and the ability of these organizations to mobilize to take advantage of participation opportunities in the host country (Thranhardt 1999, Portes et al. 2008). The model presented here offers an additional explanation for why internal organization of immigrant organizations is as an important structural variable determining the level of immigrant political mobilization in a society. If we think of the process as starting with power holders opening up decisionmaking systems in measured ways, we expect them to expose themselves only to certain kinds of inputs, restricting the function of immigrants to those inputs. If immigrants and their organizations cannot deliver the particular kinds of inputs state actors invite (and are able to understand), they cannot participate. This kind of organizational congruence with the opportunity structure is especially relevant for direct participation, which unlike voting, involves quite complicated forms of inputs and thus

necessitates organizational resources. All the more so if participation is to take place at the regional, state, or national levels.

#### **4. Organizing Direct Participation in Order to Harness Complexity in Integration Policy: Participatory Functions for Non-Citizens**

As cities and immigrant groups engage each other in a movement away from rational-instrumental forms of decisionmaking and toward more frequent use of direct participation, their power relationship changes. For gauging this relationship, we might ask questions about the relative power of immigrants and immigrant groups in the decisionmaking institution: who initiates and defines the decisionmaking situation, who sets its goals, who gets to participate, who has the power to stop discussion or veto unwanted outcomes, and who implements its decisions? I posit that a range of institutionalized power relationships is likely to emerge, from situations characterized exclusively by the use of command power by public officials vs. situations characterized by the use of original power by immigrant groups on eye-level with public officials.

Figure 2 provides an overview of the eight decisionmaking functions for immigrants (or any civic group for that matter) I gleaned from the public policy literature and from observations of the various direct participatory forms in Germany and the United States. These forms are ordered relative to one another – preliminarily – on an ordinal scale based on the supposed relative power of immigrants and their organizations. At the extreme left side of the scale, state actors dominate the institution such that immigrants are just objects of manipulation. As you move from left to right, immigrants and their groups serve different functions congruous with an increasing degree of power vis-à-vis state actors. At the extreme right-hand side, you reach institutions in which immigrants function as equal partners. Institutions have evolved in which immigrant participants function as objects, informants, contactors, coproducers, advisors, claimants, accountable agents, and equal partners.

[Figure 2 about here.]

Immigrants as objects: This is the prototypical role of persons in social systems being regulated via rational-instrumental forms of policy making. Power holders set the goals of decisionmaking and the terms of compliance.

Immigrants as informants: As researchers began investigation of the problems of rational-instrumental policy in the 1960s and 1970s, planning deficits were initially defined as an epistemological problem that presumably could be "solved by more information and a greater information-processing capacity" (Mayntz 1993: 13). Information gathering is a prerequisite of interagency coordination as well, also identified as typical method of reducing complexity (Scharpf 1994). Immigrants may become invited to serve as informants by state policy makers trying to improve policy effectiveness. Yet state power holders control the kinds of questions being asked and decide what to do with the information they gain. In this role, immigrants are responsive to bureaucrats' needs, not the other way around.

Immigrants as contactors: "Citizen" contacting is "the act of individuals approaching government officials in order to obtain some specific-related benefit from government" (Hiringer 1992: 553). It is one of several modes of non-voting political participation noted by comparativists (e.g. Verba and Nie 1972). Contacting is conceptualized as an individual, not a group act, but contacting is certainly shaped by institutional and group contexts.<sup>4</sup> Contacting aims to redirect the flow of existing services but nothing else. When immigrants as individuals and organizations engage in contacting they start to influence the distribution of the goods and services provided by public officials. At this point, immigrants and their organizations are no longer responding to the needs of bureaucratic agents; they start requesting that bureaucratic agents respond to their needs – but do not question the framework of the agents' own stated goals.

Immigrants as coproducers: "Coproduction consists of citizen involvement or participation (rather than bureaucratic responsiveness) in the delivery of urban services....Coproduction stems from voluntary cooperation on the part of citizens (rather than compliance with laws or city ordinances) and involves active (rather than passive) behaviors" (Brudney and England 1983: 63). Coproduction is a wide-spread phenomena and includes many behaviors. At the simplest level are behaviors of individuals like setting out garbage cans on collection day that require little coordination and no organizational resources. Coproduction can also be highly organized and quite hierarchically coordinated as with volunteer fire departments. Groups, too, can be activated as coproducers, perhaps taking on responsibilities for public officials in a quasi-contractual quid-pro-quo. Importantly, in the coproduction relationship, public officials retain full control over what gets produced. It stops being a coproduction relationship when participating groups try to change the service agenda, at which point the activity is no longer a form of compliance; it requires a higher degree of influence over decisionmaking.

Immigrants as Advisors: Advice is authoritative input into a decisionmaking process. Advisors do not merely inform decisionmakers. Their advice is authoritative enough to change the public agenda. Yet advisors change the agenda only when power holders have already decided to change things and are looking for authoritative advice to follow. Advisors' input is at the behest of public officials, who ultimately reserve the right to reject it.

Immigrants as claimants: In the OECD countries, all legal residents enjoy the rights of assembly and speech irrespective of citizenship status. Immigrants make use of these rights to contest the public policy agenda. When successful, this represents another step up the power scale. Koopmans and colleagues (2007: 24) define a claim as a unit of strategic action by a collective actor in the public sphere, consisting of "the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors." As they use it, the term "claims making" does not necessarily imply a specific institutional arrangement intended to connect civic groups with the state but rather the multi-institutional environment of the public sphere. Importantly, as soon as groups form to make a claim, they dramatically increase their

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<sup>4</sup> Greeley (1974) finds differences in contacting activity among different ethnic groups. Zuckerman and West (1985) find that political ties increase the rate of individual contacting.

power potential and cease to play more or less compliant roles in arrangements controlled by the state. Claims making is a role played by outsiders, not by persons on eye-level with public officials.

Immigrants as accountable-autonomous agents: In his study of mechanisms of direct democracy in Chicago, Archon Fung (2004) describes an arrangement much like the delegation of executive functions but that he calls "accountable autonomy." Fung shows that it was effective for organizing problem solving in the areas of schools and policing and also served to empower immigrants. Under this arrangement, regular "citizens" enter into an implicit agreement with state power holders by which they are placed on an equal footing with local officials within clearly delimited decisionmaking settings (creating strategies for individual schools, setting patrol priorities for police precincts, governing parks, etc.). Importantly, both the civic society and public-sector actors within these local decisionmaking groups are held accountable to higher level state authorities: decisions must be made and they must meet predetermined quality standards.

Immigrants as equal partners: The last step in the power hierarchy is into decisionmaking arrangements in which non-citizens are equal partners with state power holders and whose joint authority applies to areas of decisionmaking that are not predetermined and not hierarchically supervised.

## **5. Forms of State-Immigrant Interaction: Recommendations of the Council of Europe Compared to Practices in Germany and the United States**

The Council of Europe has made explicit recommendations for expanding opportunities and forms of political participation, many of which apply directly to non-citizen residents as well (Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 1981; Council of Europe 1992; Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 2001). These recommendations touch on almost all of the roles outline in the framework above. However, much of the language used (e.g. "dialog between citizens and local elected representatives" or "deliberative forms of decision-making" in the 2001 recommendations) remains unclear regarding the particular purposes of specific institutional arrangements. Towards clarifying what the recommendations can mean in practice, the following discussion shows the linkage between the explicit recommendation and the implicit power function it corresponds to as well as illustrations of how each power function is manifested in Germany and the United States. Additional examples with more detailed descriptions are available at <http://wwwuser.gwdg.de/~sgissen/>.

### Immigrants as Objects of Political Steering

*Council of Europe:* An oft-repeated recommendation is the improvement of power holders' information policy. The 1981 recommendations advise cities to "adopt comprehensive information policies involving particularly information officers, bulletins, brochures, local meetings and public meetings on local affairs." They are advised to provide foreign residents "a specific and active information policy." Yet state information policy can be used to encourage conforming behavior, too, and thus I see this recommendation as consistent with practices of rational-instrumental steering.

*Germany:* Between 1990 and 2007, almost 2.5 million "resettlers" arrived in Germany, mostly from the former Soviet Union (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2007). The mechanics of their repatriation are regulated by national laws<sup>5</sup> and executive orders of the national government (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2007). These require immigrants first to report to one of the country's immigrant reception facilities, from where they are distributed in contingents to the sixteen federal states. Resettlers who are dependent on social welfare income programs are required to reside in localities determined by the federal states. This allows the state to distribute resettlers evenly among the municipalities within their territories. Because resettlers enjoy the same rights of access to social welfare benefits, local governments are then required to ensure that resettlers' basic needs are met as they arrive. These rational-instrumental principles allowed the German system to handle the initial influx of German-Russian immigrants quite successfully. Issues of basic welfare such as housing never became a political issue for this group.

*United States:* An oft repeated theme in the literature on immigrant empowerment is the perception of a threat due to actions or negligence of power holder. One quite common situation is the condemnation of low-value tracts of land that houses a high number of low-income families for the purpose of redevelopment or highway construction. A well documented example is the story of Parcel 19 as documented by Mario Small (2002: 7). Its designation for redevelopment by the Boston Redevelopment Authority in the mid-1960s was the starting point for the subsequent political mobilization of the neighborhood of about 2,000 Puerto Rican immigrants.

#### Immigrants as informants

*Council of Europe:* Towards "deepening citizen influence in municipal planning" the 1981 recommendations focus on "setting up local service and administrative offices to facilitate contacts between local authorities and citizens" in what seems to be an encouragement of openness to information-providing function of resident groups in a form that would not exclude non-citizens.

*Germany:* Beginning as early as the late 1960s, some city councils had established *Ausländerbeiräte* or "foreigners' advisory councils" (Kersting 2004). These grew out of already existing networks of the organizations (churches, parties, para-public social welfare organizations) that had been active in the field of immigration as advocacy groups for immigrants. In 1971, the relevant state ministries issued the recommendation to their municipalities to create working groups of the administrative agencies involved in *Ausländerpolitik* ("foreigner policy") that would encourage the continuous information flow between city agencies, migrant organizations and para-public social welfare organizations. In 1971, foreigners were represented on only 36 of 109 such working groups, but a movement had begun to increase the representation of non-citizens on these councils which eventually resulted in the widespread use of foreigners' advisory councils, often with members directly elected by non-citizen residents. Their creation was made mandatory for cities with larger foreign populations in 1993 in Hesse and 1994 in North Rhine Westphalia. Other states allowed their creation on a non-mandatory basis. In 1997 there were 142 foreigners' advisory councils, 129 in Hesse, and 45 in Rhineland-Palatinate councils (Munier 2001). That year saw the establishment of an umbrella

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<sup>5</sup> The *Bundesvertriebenengesetze*, the *Aussiedleraufnahmegesetz*, and the *Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz*.

organization, the Federal Foreigners' Advisory Council, of 400 local councils. These institutions were created by public officials with the intention of establishing a dialog partner that could represent foreigners, meaning that they were limited to an informant function at best. Advisory councils have been criticized as being of mostly symbolic in nature, not very visible in decisionmaking processes. More recently, there has been more experimentation with the mode of selection and powers of these councils, now usually called "Integration Advisory Councils." Some cities began placing regular council members on them. Some cities have replaced them with integration committees within the city council (e.g. Hanover) with a city agency for integration (e.g. Hildesheim).

*United States:* New York City's elected executives (the mayor and the presidents of the city's boroughs) have assembled a large number of task forces and other forms of networks of organizations working in the area of immigration and integration. Examples include Queens Borough President Helen M. Marshall's immigration task force, which includes 55 organizations from many different institutional bases including universities, local government service providers, elected officials' constituent service offices, community-based organizations, legal aid societies, cultural organizations. In contrast to the rich network landscape in New York City, a different picture emerges in a study of 299 California municipalities with at least 15% non-native born population (Ramakrishnan and Lewis 2005: 23). Only about half of elected officials could, when asked, name a single organization "they 'would be likely to turn to in order to help reach' immigrant residents, regarding salient issues or government programs in their city. a single immigrant organization. The smaller the city, the less likely an elected official could name even one immigrant organization. One-third of elected officials reported that they have a 'hard time learning about the political or policy interests of local immigrants'" (Ramakrishnan and Lewis 2005: vi). Networks that include immigration organizations playing an informing role are thus probably a phenomenon of large cities.

#### Immigrants as contactors

*Council of Europe:* The 2001 recommendations advise cities to pay "careful attention" to the "demands and expectations" of citizens so as to be "responsive" to their needs. Although the core issue of contacting – the distribution of scarce resources – is not mentioned, the recommendation certainly ties into the role of individuals and groups as contactors.

*Germany:* One of the most widespread forms of contacting involves the formalized process of local government subsidies of cultural activities. Local immigrant organizations participate in this process, competing with other organizations for resources.

*United States:* Ramakrishnan and Lewis (2005: 36) report on a number of institutions in California cities that help immigrant residents in contacting. A good example is San Francisco's Immigrant Rights Commission, created by public officials in 1997 to improve immigrant access to social services among other functions. "The commission was empowered to receive complaints from immigrant residents regarding the provision of services, and it works with individual departments to resolve such complaints." This commission also engages in claims making ("advocacy") activities.

### Immigrants as coproducers

*Council of Europe:* The 2001 recommendations suggest encouraging local residents to "accept their responsibility to contribute to the life of their communities" and to become involved in the "implementation of projects [that] have a direct bearing on their environment, such as the creation and maintenance of green areas and playgrounds, the fight against crime," etc. This is a clear description of the rationale, method, and application areas of coproduction. The 2001 recommendations also encourage the "forging of contracts or agreements between" organizations and local authorities concerning the respective rights, roles, and expectations in their dealing with one another." At the point at which the city enters into a contractual relationship with community groups, the basis for co-production is laid.

*Germany:* German public officials make extensive use of co-production arrangements in virtually every area of community life. A recent example is the Turkish Parents' Association in Berlin-Brandenburg, which receives project-based support from the city for its "Elternaktiv" work, through which it provides communications training for parents, principals and teachers and anti-violence and conflict-negotiation training for pupils of all nationalities.

*United States:* Co-production is widespread in the U.S. and comes in many different forms, often combining public and private funding and directing it to immigrant organizations. A recent study of 85 community based organizations that provided after-school programs to low-income Latino families found that "[m]ost programs were patched together with a mix of public funds and private foundation and corporate dollars" (NCLR 2008: 9). Most of the after-school programs in the Miami area were fully or partially dependent on the Children's Trust, a tax-based funding source for education programs for Miami Dade's youth. After school programs in New York State were funded by a non-profit organization (TASC - The After School Corporation) that receives both public and private sector support.

### Immigrants as Advisors

*Council of Europe:* The 1981 recommendation focus on the provision of "efficient consultation procedures" especially for "voluntary organizations" (Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 1981: 2). The Council's Convention on Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level also explicitly advises member states to endeavor to consult foreign residents on local matters. "Consultation" clearly describes the expectation that participating groups play the advisor and not just the informant role.

*Germany:* A slew of neighborhood-level planning processes was initiated by the German federal government in cooperation with the states when it launched its urban development program in 1999 entitled "Districts With Special Development Needs – the Socially Integrative City." By 2007, 498 neighborhoods in 318 towns and cities had become involved in the program, which channels funds into neighborhood development projects. To gain funding, applicants must demonstrate a plan to open up decisionmaking processes to residents' needs and preferences. Typically, roundtables were created for residents to come together with planners to discuss neighborhood needs. The degree to which immigrant groups played advising and not informing roles differs from place to place. These projects and the ways in which immigrant groups were incorporated in the

planning processes are documented through a national, internet based clearing house (<http://www.sozialestadt.de/praxisdatenbank/suche/index.php>).

*United States:* When the national government created its Community Development Block Grant program in the mid-1970s, many cities used this funding opportunity to increase neighborhood involvement in municipal affairs. Cincinnati, for example, established and financially supported community development advisory councils that were integrated into "an extensive system for involving those groups in municipal governance" by the mid-1980s. By then, two-thirds of city agencies reported that neighborhood councils had a say "in the eventual shape of municipal programs to meet [neighborhood] preferences" (Thomas 1987:98). Immigrant groups do not play a large role in Cincinnati yet, but Ramakrishnan and Lewis (2005: 35-6) found commissions in three of four California case-study cities "with the power to advise the city in its disbursement of federal community development block grants, which often led to interactions with immigrant-focused nonprofits."

#### Immigrants as claimants

*Council of Europe:* None of the recommendations touch on the claims making function.

*Germany:* Protest or claims making in the media are not a widespread activities for immigrant groups in Germany, one reason being the presence of native-language press as an alternative communications medium, especially for Turkish immigrants. One of the better known examples of a claims-making organization was the Federation of Spanish Parents' Associations in the Federal Republic of Germany, which was formed in 1973. At that time, the various German states begun trying to incorporate the children of guest workers in their schools in way which in some cases were felt to be discriminatory. Bavaria, for example, put these children in segregated classes with no contact with German pupils. The Federation publicly articulated a "no" to discriminatory practices (Riesgo 1999: 124). Both Spanish and Turkish parents' organizations continue to lobby against the German 3-track school system, which has been shown to discriminate against children from economically disadvantaged backgrounds.

*United States:* Claims making in every form is extremely widespread among immigrant advocacy groups in the United States, and the list of claims making organizations is endless. The American Friends Service Committee (<http://www.afsc.org/ImmigrantsRights/>), a Quaker organization, and the National Council of La Raza (<http://www.nclr.org/>), a Latino rights organization with roots in Mexican-American communities, give just a taste of the kinds of groups engaging in claims making. Many such organizations are active on all levels of government with full-time professional staff and engage in multiple claims-making strategies. Moreover, many groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union use litigation as an effective channel of claims making and policy reform.

#### Immigrants as accountable-autonomous agents

*Council of Europe:* The 1981 and 2001 recommendations advise cities to delegate executive powers to sub-municipal bodies (Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 1981: 3).

*Germany:* Instances of the state devolving decisionmaking authority to groups who then arrive at solutions to a common problem autonomously and who are accountable to the state have a long tradition in Germany. This is the corporatist model of political steering. Local governments turned to the corporatism as a decisionmaking model in the 1980s (Heinze and Voelzkow 1994) and North Rhine Westphalia and Lower Saxony have also introduced institutions of accountable autonomy in their school systems. However, whether these arrangements have served to increase opportunities for immigrant participation has yet to be studied.

*United States:*

In 1994, the Chicago Police Department implemented an alternative policing strategy on a city-wide basis that turned local beats into accountable, autonomous decisionmaking institutions that were open to input from residents regardless of citizenship status (Fung 2004:56). The reform required police to meet regularly with residents to jointly identify public-safety problems to be solved. Joint decisions were binding but subject to the supervision of higher-level police management. These institutions made participation possible for all residents regardless of citizenship status, sometimes with surprisingly integrative results.

#### Immigrants as equal partners

*Council of Europe:* The 2001 recommendations advise cities to use devices "for co-opting citizens to decision-making bodies, including representative bodies" and for involving citizens in public sector management. Where created, these need not necessarily discriminate on the basis of citizenship status and could make them into equal partners, as in the case of Germany.

*Germany:* As one form of reaction to the dissatisfaction with foreigners' advisory councils was to create genuine committees for integration issues inside the city council proper. One of the earliest experiments was made by Stuttgart, which created its "International Committee" in 2004. It consists of 13 councilpersons plus the mayor and twelve additional "experts" (non-council members with immigrant background). Although the committee itself is an "advisory," not a "deciding" committee, it does have the power to submit resolution proposals to the whole council and also has the right to demand information from city agencies. The expert members, once selected are full, voting members of the committee (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart 2007: 31.). This is as close as it gets in Germany to eye-to-eye partnership between citizens and non-citizens in political decisionmaking.

*United States:*

Ramakrishnan and Lewis (2005: *vi*) report what they call a "form of political tutelage" or the recruitment of immigrants and minorities for service on appointive city boards and commissions." Their study showed, however, that in some cities, immigrants served as genuinely equal members while in others even native born persons of immigrant background felt shut out of decisionmaking. Immigrants' experiences with organizations or arrangements that allow them to influence the political process on eye-level with elected and other public officials come also through the direct influence immigrants and their organizations can bring to bear in a political context. There is no better example than the techniques used by many faith-based community organizations following the

example set by Saul Alinsky in the 1940s, a form of organizing has taken off in the U.S. both for citizens and non-citizens (Wood 2001: 250). These organizations use a standard organizational model whereby trained organizers will start working in a church congregation at the invitation of the pastor to get members to identify community problems and develop an action plan. To solve the problem, a person in power (often an elected official) is targeted and invited to "accountability sessions," which involves putting them on a stage in front of dozens if not hundreds of residents and demanding a self-commitment to the organization's goal. Power holders often find it much easier to bow to the power of the group than to resist.

## **6. The Emergence of New Structures of Meta-Governance: Strong Democracy or the Strong State ?**

The central theme of this paper is that citizenship is not a dichotomous variable delineating the "ins" from the "outs" but is rather the product of a continuing process of mutual adaptation between the holders of the command power of the state and the holders of what I call "original" power. Nowhere can this be more clearly seen than in the area of integration policy, which explicitly involves persons without legal citizenship. Underlying my initial motivation for investigating state-immigrant interactions and the recommendations of the Council of Europe regarding the increase of participatory government is the glimmer of hope that by increasing participation public officials can change the meta-structures of governance. The objective is the creation of the political conditions by which each and every individual is a *constituent* in the broadest sense of the word: persons who have the power to alter their piece of social reality regardless of personal background or citizenship status (Ramakrishnan and Lewis 2005).

Yet this conjectural and preliminary study of the emergence of meta-structures in immigrant-state governance has made me more cautious. For when power holders start using new participatory instruments, the end effect may be anything but an increase in the original power of immigrant groups. As power holders respond to complex problems of integration by initiating interaction with non-citizens, the empowerment of non-citizen constituents is only one potential outcome. Another possible outcome is a state that has obviated its need for participation because it has become much more efficient and effective at regulating the problems of integration.

Because of the inherent ambivalence of outcomes of mutual adaptation processes, my future questions will focus on the "careers" of immigrant organizations and the emergence of new meta-structures of governance in integration policy. This is an area that has seen precious little research, although the political and social transformations it encompasses are at least as significant as those spurred by the rise of trade unions or of the women's rights movement. My attempt at comparing the US and German cases reveals two very different contexts in which the career paths of immigrant organizations are taking, with important ramifications for our societies.

The model of mutual adaptation presented here leads to speculation that organizational careers can be propelled by what Hendrik Wagenaar (2007: 42) calls a "positive coevolutionary dynamic," by which the opportunities for participation gradually expand as

if interaction between state officials and immigrants is successful in one area and thus encourages branching out into new areas of cooperation. This might gradually change immigrant frames and lead to an expansion of immigrant organization's administrative capacities. Thus begins the organization's career. The history of some of the more established immigrant organizations in the United States and Germany reveals some evidence that this kind of process has occurred.

CASA of Maryland was founded in 1985 with a staff of two persons mainly as service organization for newly arriving Latinos in the D.C. area. As the needs of immigrants grew in complexity, CASA responded by expanding and diversifying its programs and geographic scope. The organization grew to encompass in the entire state of Maryland and developed partnerships with local governments, churches, individuals, and private foundations including the influential Annie E. Casey Foundation of Baltimore (founded by the family that owns UPS). The organization had begun receiving public funds for its social service work, benefited from network structures in immigration policy like those noted above, and became an inside player in Maryland health and human services politics. This set the stage for transformation of the state government in 2006, when the influence of CASA de Maryland on the Maryland government became more apparent. Marylanders had elected Martin O'Malley governor that year, a candidate who wanted to reform the state's immigrant and integration policy. In 2008, he appointed the prominent first-generation Latino civil rights lawyer, law professor, and public administrator Tom Perez to be his secretary of labor. Perez served on the board of CASA de Maryland; the prominence of this organization helped lay the political groundwork for the appointment a Latino to one of the most important positions for immigrants in the state. In March of 2009, Perez was nominated by the Obama administration to the post of Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, effectively putting a pro-immigration immigrant in charge of the government's civil rights enforcement effort. The meta-governance structure in integration politics is the combination of a large, multi-functional immigrant organization that has become gradually more institutionalized with increasing funding from local and state governments and a state government looking to expand its control over immigration problems.

In the CASA de Maryland example, the power benefits of interaction seem to have accrued mostly to immigrant organizations. In other cases, the main benefits may flow to public officials and police. The initiative of Mayor John DeStafano New Haven to create a municipal ID card for all New Haven residents regardless of citizenship status is an interesting case in point.<sup>6</sup> It was couched as a pragmatic answer to many problems non-citizens encounter due to their lack of proper identification and was created in cooperation with community based organizations. The card makes it easier for non-citizens to get access to municipal services, but it also makes it easier for police to keep track of residents' identities.

Turning to Germany, we see no immigrant organizations with CASA de Maryland's degree of institutionalization or political influence. German migrant organizations are handicapped by a highly institutionalized traditional organizations doing health and human services policy in cooperation with the state. These organizations are rooted in

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<sup>6</sup> <http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/Mayor/ReadMore.asp?ID={7B4AC7D4-FA8F-4FE7-B3E9-CB9FD5BDF223}>. Accessed 26 March 2009.

the union movement and in churches and essentially took the organizational development route in the area of coproduction of human services in the 19th century that organizations like CASA are just now taking today in the United States. Grass-roots German immigrant organizations may do similar things and open up similar participatory functions as American counterparts, but as they grow they find the of social policy organizations quite crowded. The current situation is characterized by competition between established native and new immigrant organizations over the "privilege" of coproducing with the state.

The German case also reveals another important difference in the meta-governance structures of integration policy. American immigrant organizations like CASA de Maryland never work alone. They are backed by influential private foundations who bring not only funding but political and social connections within government. Thus in the United States, immigrant groups stand alongside established private sector organizations as they interact with government officials. This is perhaps one of the more typically American structures of meta-governance in integration policy. German foundations are large and politically influential, but they shy away from direct funding of organizations that engage in claims making functions – this may be an important handicap in Germany's integration efforts. The gap in support is, ironically, being filled by the state itself. For example, Berlin requires "tandem" applications for some of its funding – where an established health and human services organizations applies jointly with an immigrant organization partner for city funds. We see here evidence of the organizational dominance of state actors in the German case, a characteristic that may define its meta-governance structures in integration policy.

In sum, then, these very preliminary observations of structures of meta-governance suggest that the pre-existing citizenship regimes as discussed above are being reinforced, not transformed when new structures of direct participation are introduced. In the United States, immigrant organizations can grow into relatively autonomous and highly institutionalized multifunctional entities which reinforce the standpoints of an ethnic minority. Educated, skilled, and politically motivated persons with immigrant backgrounds can use them as springboards to the highest levels of power. In Germany, immigrant organizations are checked in their growth by competition with existing organizations. Educated, skilled, and politically motivated persons with immigrant backgrounds must turn to "German" organizations to get access to political power. The assimilationist tradition is reproduced, but for reasons that have nothing to do with the political intentions of its leaders.

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
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**Figure 2: Expected Range of Functions of Non-Citizens in Integration Policy**

